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### Role of UN Presence in a Solution of the Cuban Problem

The US must have adequate arrangement for verification and inspection to be more that: (a) offensive weapons are removed from Cuba and (b) that no more are introduced. This paper examines the pros and cons of establishing a continuing UN presence to achieve these two objectives. As part of any such arrangement, it is assumed the Communists would request that any such UN operation should also be extended to the US to verify compliance with our commitment not to invade Cuba.

On the basis of the foregoing assumptions, dollowing are the principal advantages and disadvantages involved in establishing a Unpresence for Cuba:

### 1. Advantesfe

- a. Abcontinuing Un presence able to operate on Cubin soil would be the best way which seems available to absure that all offensive weapons have been mithdrawn from Cuba and to verify Soviet compliance with their commitment not to reintroduce offensive weapons. While both of these objectives can be at least partially attained by unilateral UE air and sea surveillance, an international inspection team operating on the ground would clearly give us a more water tight guarantee against any violation of the agreement.
- b. A UN presence in Cubs would be the most satisfactory form
  of assurance to public opinion in that our full demands would have been

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c. Acceptance

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- c. Acceptance of such a step by the Communist world would represent a major breakkhrough in establishing that any future disarmament agreements must include adequate control provisions.
- d. The establishment and operation of such UN presence would strengthen the Organization as an independent international executive and would give it invaluable experience for similar future responsibilities. It would help to bolster the UN as a third party instrumentality in a Big Power dispute by putting into the field continuing arrangements.

### 2. Disadvantages

- a. Placing a UN presence in Cuba and perhaps the US or elsewhere in the Western Hemisphereto assure against an invasion of Cuba would tend to legitaize Castro and perpetuate his regime. Such a consideration could be expected to weigh heavily in the minds of the Latin American states.
- b. If we can obtain reasonably satisfactory assurance of Soviet compliance with their agreement regarding Cubs through unilateral means, e.g., Kusnetsevis proposals to McCloy plus continued US surveillance of Cubs for the long term, then we ourselves tend to up the Communist ante by injecting an element which works to our disadvantage because of (a) above.
- c. In the same connection, it would seem very difficult to draw a line between UN verification against invasion and UN verification that there will be no Cubm rebel activity directed against Castrol.

  That is, for such an arrangement to be accepted as meaningful as far as Western compliance is concerned, presumably a UN presence would have to operate not only in Guantanamo and the US but in neighboring Latin

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imerican states as well. To many observers, Cuba would seem to be getting the best of such a bargain. This is particularly true becaused in our openisociety, it would be extracely difficult to continue to render any assistance to Cuba emigres whereas the Castro regime could be expected to continue to "expert its revolution" through covert means. (Perhaps the best counter to this aspect of the problem would be to insist that a UN presence operating in Cuba itself would be adequate assurance for Castro that there would be no invasion since UN observers could be called upon immediately to examine the facts at first hand and report to the Secretary General when and if such an invasion appeared to threaten him.)

d. Un observation in parts of the US (while not breaking new ground, i.e., IAEA inspection of our four reactors) would seem to equate us with Cuba with no comparable inspection of the USSR.

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3. Practical Aspects.

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There are several forms which a UK presence for Cuba might take:

- (a) A UN Presence Limited to Cuba alone. This aspect has been discussed in detail in Deptel .
- (b) A UN Presence in the Caribbean. In such an arrangement, it would be preferable to have the headquarters of the UN presence located outside Cuba in some suitable Caribbean country. Such a presence would require complete freedom of movement and right of access throughout the area.

  Inspection would be by mixed teams; in no case would self-inspection be permitted. A link with the OAS would be desirable.
- (c) A UK Presence in Cubs and the United States. The size of such a UK presence would depend on its terms of reference and the extent to which its activities in the United States would be intended primarily for a symbolic purpose. To ensure effectively against any invasion emanating from the US, either a US attack or an attack by Cuban rebels, a sizeable UK contingent would be required, presumably including UP inspectors at every major port to ensure that there is no movement of troops which could be designed to launch an attack on Cuba. However, it is unlikely that even the communists would expect such a comprehensive surveillance of US activities and it might suffice for their purposes to have a dosen or so UK inspectors stationed at key ports in the southern

and eastern part of the United States. (Cuba might also ask for free access to any area where there is reported training of Cuban rebels.)

(d) A UN Presence in Cuba, the United States and other Pemispheric States.

The same considerations as in (c) would apply except that there would have

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to be a major team of UN observers to cover activities in Latin American countries from which hostile activities might be directed against Castro.

- (e) A UN Presence for All of Latin America. This possibility would be especially appropriate in the context of an agreement on an nuclear-free some in Latin America. This appears the most attractive possibility since it can be more easily confined to the problem of assuring against reintroduction of fofesmive weapons into Cube and helps avoid some of the difficult questions involved once one emberks on a search for an operational Uninstrument to protect Castro against hostile elements operating outside Cuba.
- Patrol in the Cartibean area might have the dual function of checking all incoming cargoes to Cuba from Soviet bloc posts and nave the responsibility of reporting to the Secretary General evidence indicating possible invasion of Cuba. This would in effect be a Un quarantine against reintroduction of weapons and invasion. This type of Un presence would avoid the problems inherent in establishing Un surveillance on Cuban/US xmil territory. It would afford protection against reintroduction of offensive weapons, but the price we would pay would be protection of Castro against outside interference with his regime.



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
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- c. Acceptance of such a step by the Communist world would represent a major breakthrough hn establishing that any future disarrament agreements must include adequate control provisions.
- d. The establishment and operation of such UN presence would strengthen the Organization as an independent international executive and would give it invaluable experience for similar future responsibilities. It would help to bolster the UN as a third party instrumentality in a Rig Power dispute by putting into the field continuing arrangements.

### 2. Disadventages

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
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